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REMARKS
ON THE

HARTFORD CONVENT I ON....No. L

MESSRS. ED ITO R S,

A w r i t e r in the National Intelligencer, signing himself “ One
o f the Convention,” having commenced a series o f papers, the
intention o f which is to prove that the famous H artford Conven
tion, o f December 1814, has been calumniated in the ears o f the
American people, b y those who have attributed to it the object
o f a dismemberment o f the Union, I ask o f you the favor to
insert in your paper some remarks on that Convention, and on
the vindication o f it which this Member has thus commenced.
T he objects o f this Convention were so often, so distinctly,
and in so vast a variety o f forms, avowed, that I pledge m yself
to prove to your readers that these objects have not been mista
ken ; that the leading object o f that meeting pursuant to a system
which had been nurtured by the federal party, for years, was,
either to assume a dictation over the general government which
should give them an immediate and commanding influence in its
councils— an influence wholly foreign to the spirit o f our consti
tution, and most solemnly reprobated by the farewell injunctions
o f W a s h i n g t o n — or, in the failure o f this disorganizing purpose,
to conclude a separate peace between a section o f our country
and our enemy, Great Britain, and thereby, at a blow, to dis
solve our Union. It is the case o f the robber: he demands my
m on ey ; if I give it, w e ll; if not, death.
Before redeeming this pledge, I would premise two remarks :
First. This pledge is given, and will be redeemed, without
the slightest feeling o f personal hostility against a single individ
ual com posing or advocating that Convention. A m ong them
the writer recognizes some whom, in private life, he is proud to
rank among his warmest friends. It is public considerations,

not personal, which induce him to expose what he verily believes
to be the atrocious objects o f that Convention. When parties
become mutually irritated and inflamed, what is there to prevent
that party which has an ascendency, in any section o f the country, from resorting to unjust and ruinous measures o f policy,
unless, it be the fear o f public indignation when these measures
shall have been subjected to the ordeal o f cool, dispassionate
investigation ? W e say, there is nothing adequate but this. And
this check must be sacredly preserved. However we may be
inclined, in this period o f political calm, to throw oblivion on
past differences o f opinion, still patriotism owes a solemn duty to
the republic. It owes to the republic, that the nefarious projects
o f the Hartford Convention should never be forgotten ; that they
should be held up to eternal detestation, in order that future con
spirators against the republic may profit by the awful, yet neces
sary example. It is this feeling, and not a personal one, that
will dictate our subsequent remarks.
Second. While censuring the abettors o f that Convention, we
earnestly beg to be understood not to criminate with them the
whole federal party, much less the whole o f New England. W e
have seen, with regret and surprise, in the second letter o f your
correspondent, (whom, for brevity’ s sake, we shall hereafter call
“ a member,” ) the remark, that his enquiry involves “ the vital
soundness o f the heart o f the New England population
and
that “ an immense majority o f the people o f Massachusetts, C on
necticut, and Rhode Island, and respectable portions o f those o f
New-Hampshire and Vermont, are emphatically responsible for
the organization o f that Convention, and the sanction bestowed
upon its result.” W e protest, we utterly, we vehemently protest,
against this false doctrine. It is not so. This “ immense ma
jority” n e v e r existed. In p roof o f our position, we give the
two following statements :
1.
O f the votes given in New England, for the candidates o f
the two parties respectively, at the
firstelection o f the Governors
o f the several states after the declaration o f war :

Republican.
Vermont, September, 18 12,
19,158
N ew Hampshire, March, 1813,
17,410
Massachusetts, April, 1813,
42,789
Connecticut,
do.
7,201
Rhode Island,
do.
(no candidate)
Total,

86,558

Federal.
15,950
18, 107
56,754
12,916
3,350
107,077

N ote.— Rhode Island, in 18 12, gave Republican 3,784, Federal 4,122.

2.

O f those given for the same at the second:

Republican.
16,828
Vermont, September, 1813,
18,784
New Hampshire, March, 1814,
45,953
Massachusetts, April, 1814,
2,619
Connecticut,
do.
800
R hode Island,
do.
abou
t
84,984

Federal.
16,582
19,675
56,374
9,415
2,713
104,759

T he latter statement, with the exception o f Vermont, shows
the strength o f the two parties at the elections next preceding
the period o f the Hartford Convention. Vermont, in September,
1814, gave Republican 17,411, Federal 1 7 ,4 6 6 ; making the
aggregate votes at the elections next preceding, thus: Republi
can 85,567, Federal 105,643.
Thus we see that, in the most gloom y period o f the war, the
federal majority was so trifling that the change o f only one-sixteenth
o f the whole number o f the voters from the federal to the republi
can side, would have given a republican majority in New
E n g la n d ; and that, at the period o f the Convention, it was even
still less.
Where, then, was the member’s “ immense majority,” even on
the general question between the two parties ? It never existed.
Much less did it exist on the question o f the Convention. Let
that question, fully explained in all its bearings, have been put to
the people o f New England, at large, and, instead o f a desertion
o f one-sixteenth, it would have been five times that proportion. On
that question, thus explained, we feel entirely confident that not
even one-sixth part o f New-England would have been in favor
o f the Convention, and probably not one-twentieth part.
Away, then, with the assertion, that an “ immense majority,”
sanctioned the Convention ; that “ the vital soundness o f the
heart o f the New England population” rests on this question.
Born and educated in “ the heart” o f this population ; bound to
it by all the ties o f nature and o f affection, I will not chastise my
indignation at the slander. N o : there never existed a people
who, from their education, their habits, their principles, their in
dustry, and their fixed patriotism, were better fitted to perpetuate
the blessings o f free government, than the people o f New England.
So far were this people from approving the Hartford Convention,
that one o f the apologies used by the friends o f the Convention,
to appease the disappointed feelings o f those Hotspurs, who had
been waiting for insurrection, was, that it had been found that
the people were not yet prepared.

I f any further doubt remains o f the real feelings o f this people,
look at New England. Where is now this “ immense majority ?”
Where is now the federal party o f New England ? In one o f
the five states, It is true, they have preserved a tremulous power,
by their adroitness in taking shelter behind the popularity o f one
amiable man. Where this power would have now been, had a
certain other person ( “ One o f the Convention” ) been the candi
date for Governor, we leave him to say. But look at the four
other states; and where is the federal party ? Annihilated. O f
the forty-one Representatives in Congress, elected from New
England just before the Convention met, thirty-eight were Fed
eralists— now only six ! Does any one wish additional p roof to
determine what are the sentiments o f “ the heart o f the New E ng
land population,” respecting the Hartford Convention? Let
them not be slandered.

No. II.
I n our first number, we pledged ourselves to show, that the
real object o f the Hartford Convention was, either to assume an
unconstitutional and most unwarrantable dictation over the gen
eral government, or, on the failure o f that object, to form a
separate peace with our enemy, and thus to dissolve the Union.
W e also premised two remarks : 1. That no personal feeling
prompted us to this pledge, but that we were led to it by the
conviction, that patriotism demands o f every citizen an eternal
reprobation o f that disorganizing convention. 2. That we dis
avow all intention o f criminating the whole federal party, much
less the wh ole New England population, in relation to that
Convention; and that the allegation o f “ One o f the Convention,”
that an “ immense majority” o f Massachusetts and other states,
and “ the heart o f the New England population,” is responsible
for that Convention, is a gross libel on New England.
In support o f the last remark, one fact was omitted. After
stating that the complete and almost immediate prostration o f
the federal party, in four o f five o f the New England states, vin
dicated the people o f those states from the charge o f participation,
and that a similar fate in Massachusetts had been avoided only
by the popularity o f one man, we ought to have added the fol
lowing fact : In February, 1816, one year after the Convention,
Gov. Strong declined a re-election to the office o f C hief Magis
trate. A federal caucus was held, and Mr. O t i s , who had been
a member o f the Convention, was requested to be the candidate.
It was, however, perfectly understood that this was a mere form,

a mere compliment to distinguished services ; that Mr. Otis,
though styled “ the man o f the people,” “ the beloved Otis,”
could not be elected ; and that the reason why he could not was,
simply and solely , his connection with that Convention. Mr.
O t i s , therefore, as was intended, declined.
Now, permit us to ask, where was at that time the “ immense
majority” o f Massachusetts in favor o f the Convention ? The
fact shows a striking contrast between the opinion o f Mr. O t i s
and the assertion o f “ One o f the Convention.”
W e proceed now to the main subject— the objects o f the C on
vention.
T h e Member, in his four letters already published, rests his
vindication o f the Convention on three points : the recorded
legislative proceedings o f the states engaged in the project, the
Journal o f the Convention now open to inspection, and the printed
Report o f the Convention. Because no declared intention o f
dissolving the Union is found in these records, the Member
infers, that no “ fair and correct evidence” o f such intention exists.
Does the Member need to be informed, that this inference is
wholly unsound ? Does he need to be informed, that neither
treason nor misdemeanor delights in open d ay ? Foolish indeed
beyond all example, would have been such a declaration from the
implicated legislatures. Far more prudent was it to do what
they did do ; to lay out the broad field o f “ public grievances,”
through which the Convention might range at pleasure, and plant
whatever noxious weed should be found most congenial with the
soil.
But it seems the report o f the Convention does not recommend
a dismemberment ; and the identical journal itself is now open
to every eye. T h e writer o f these remarks has not yet taken the
pains to see this precious document, now first exposed ; nor does
he much care to see it. W ho can believe that a body o f men,
whose objects were so suspicious that the veil o f closed doors
must be drawn between their doings and the public eye— even
the eye o f their own political friends— would still be so wanting
in sagacity, as to commit to writing that portion o f their delib
erations which they were sure would meet with public reproof ?
W e do not think so meanly o f their prudence. N or does their
report prove a tittle more. T hey met, they talked, they looked
on all sides— they found, as their own friends acknowledged, that
the people were not yet prepared ; they found that, to pass the
Rubicon then was to ensure their own destruction ; and they
therefore wisely, very wisely, preferred discretion to the worst
part o f valor. T hey preferred to wait. T hey therefore recom
mended, among other measures, that application should be made to

the general government for redress o f grievances, (in pursuance
o f which advice, certain commissioners came on to Washington,
and went back again ;) and that, if this step should fail o f obtain
ing what they wished, (o f which office may possibly have been a
part,) “ a n o t h e r c o n v e n t io n ” should be held in Boston the
June following, “ with such powers and instructions as the exi
gency o f a crisis so momentous may require.” And their leading
writer (L*w*ll— Boston Centinel, January 14, 1815) when
apologizing to their “ active spirits” for the tameness o f the C on
vention proceedings, explicitly called on the general government
to “ tremble (if they did not wish to see c o n f u s i o n ) at the result
o f the proposed Convention in June.”
Such is the defence o f the prisoner at the bar. His three wit
nesses prove nothing : they merely give the negative testimony
that they did not see the criminal a c t ; while every one knows
that the act may have been committed, in all its blackness, with
out the slightest cognizance on their part.
But one o f the witnesses does not stop here. The printed re
port testifies positively against the defendant. It discusses, through
several paragraphs, the topics o f the defects o f our constitution—
o f their incurableness— o f the expediency o f a “ dissolution” o f
the “ Union” — o f “ open resistance” — o f the proper time for this
dissolution— and o f “ some new form o f confederacy” for “ those
states, which shall intend to maintain a federal relation to each
other.”
Such is the testimony o f the defendant’s own witness ; and are
we now to be insulted by the remark, that this Convention never
thought o f a dissolution o f the U n ion ; that its only object, its
kind, benevolent, patriotic object, was, to aid the general govern
ment in defending a portion o f its country ? A w ay with such an
insult.
Having spoken o f the negative testimony adduced in defence o f
the Convention, we shall in our next proceed to the positive testi
mony against i t ; and prove, we trust, that public sentiment has
done an act o f simple justice, by consigning the memory o f the
Hartford Convention to permanent disgrace.

No. III.
T he almost unanimous re-election o f Mr. Jefferson, in 1805,
forbad all hope in the breasts o f those who opposed his adminis
tration, that they could ever regain the control o f the National
Councils. T he love o f political sway is an unconquerable pas
sion. It is not, therefore, extraordinary, perhaps, that some o f

the most ardent leaders o f this opposition, in the firm persuasion
o f the wisdom, the disinterestedness, and the singular efficacy with
which their management o f affairs would be stamped, should
really wish to govern a hardy, industrious, and intelligent section
o f the republic, rather than that their talents and virtues should
lie almost useless to their country.
When, therefore, the embargo, in 1808, had produced a sec
tional feeling in New England, opposed to the National Adminis
tration, and had given to the Federal party a leading influence in
the State Governments o f that section, much exertion was made to
convince the people o f those states, that they had very separate
interests from those o f the southern states, and that the General
Government was determined to support the latter, and to crush the
former. Infl ammatory appeals were made to the public ; and
frequent and explicit threats were given o f direct resistance to
what was called the despotic and wicked arm o f the National
Government.
From a subsequent disclosure it appears, that, during this perio d,
Henry, the Agent o f the Governor General o f Canada, was actu
ally within this excited district o f our country, for the express
purpose o f tampering with the apparent disposition o f some o f our
citizens to secede from the Union. I f his testimony is admitted,
and we do not see reason to doubt it, a division o f the Union
was at that time seriously agitated. In a letter to Gov. Craig,
dated “ Boston, March 7, 1809,” he distinctly declares :
“ I have now ascertained, with as much accuracy as possible, the course
intended to be pursued by the party in Massachusetts that is opposed to the
measures and politics o f the Administration o f the General Government.
“ I have already given a decided opinion, that a declaration o f war is not
to be expected ; but, contrary to all reasonable calculation, should the C on
gress possess spirit and independence enough to place their popularity in
jeopardy by so strong a measure, the Legislature o f Massachusetts will give
the tone to the neighboring states ; will declare itself permanent until a new
election o f members ; invite a Congress, to be composed o f Delegates from
the Federal states, and erect a separate government for their com m on defence
and common interest.”

Some, perhaps, may seek to weaken the force o f this testimony,
by attempting to discredit the witness. But, we ask, on what
grounds is this done ? Aside from the appearance o f truth at
tending the whole correspondence, there are several circumstances
which strongly corroborate it.
In the first place, this testimony very fully coincides, with the
tone o f the federal prints and federal resolutions at that period.
Threats o f resistance were frequent and pointed; and deliberate
remarks on the expediency o f a dissolution o f the Union were
now and then advanced— though instances o f the latter were few,
since, as Henry expresses it, they found it ‘ a very unpopular topic.’

In the second place, Henry was known to be an intimate asso
ciate with many o f the leading federalists o f Boston. He was
once on a short excursion o f pleasure with several o f them, when
they happened to need the company and aid o f a farmer— a plain
honest rustic. In the course o f the conversation, this very sub
ject o f a separation o f the states was discussed ; but they disagreed
respecting the line which should form the limit o f the new con
federacy— whether the Hudson, the Delaware, or other boundary.
At length, recollecting their companion, they asked him what
side he would take when the question should come to issue. He
frankly answered, that he should take the side o f his country,
whoever should be its enemies. This the writer o f these remarks
had from the farmer himself, and his character stamps the account
with entire credit.
In the third place, the plan avowed by Henry coincides re
markably with that developed and partially executed, six years
after, near the close o f the war. W ar was declared ; the legis
lature o f Massachusetts gave the tone, and invited a Congress (or
Convention) o f delegates from the federal states ; and the object
declared by “ One o f the Convention” is the same as that declared
by Henry— “ common defence.”
This plan, developed by Henry, was to have been executed
immediately after the New England elections, in April, 1809.
But, in that very month, Erskine's arrangement was concluded,
and demolished the wh ole plan o f operation.
In the year following, the republican party once more gained
the ascendency in Massachusetts, and retained it till 1812. N o
opportunity, therefore, o f executing the project o f 1809 occured,
till the declaration o f war against Great Britain, in June, 1812.
In August, 1812, the project was resumed, not by the legislature
o f Massachusetts, as Henry avowed, because the Senate had a
decided republican majority, which would have embarrassed the
operations. County meetings were therefore called, and dele
gates appointed to “ a State Convention,” which should take the
place o f the legislature in giving “ the tone” to the other states.
It was at the Boston meeting for this purpose, that the pat
riotic D e x t e r stepped forth from his party, and boldly advocated
the cause o f his country. The shock was instantly felt. His
voice was the bolt o f Heaven ; it spread dismay in the breast o f
faction. Though several counties actually appointed delegates
to this “ State Convention,” yet the “ lethalis arundo” o f Dexter
stuck fast : the project languished, and died.
I f the real objects o f this Convention are doubted, the doubt
is removed by the following remarks o f Mr. Dexter at the above
meeting :

“ L et it be remembered, that resolves and conventions, promising as much
good to the public as the one now contemplated, and not more threatening
in their language and aspect, have, within our own recollection, preceded one
insurrection, [Shay’s,] which shook this commonwealth to its centre, and
threatened to draw the neighboring states into its perilous vortex ; and another
[in Pennsylvania] which required the strong arm o f the national government
to quell its lawless and desolating fury. Permit me to add, those who delib
erately originate and aid insurrection by seditious resolves, are at all times
amenable to the laws for the consequences, and generally more guilty in fo ro
conscientœ, than the inconsiderate rabble whom they instigate to murder and
treason.”

And he afterwards expressly says, that “ a separation o f the
states” is suggested, as one o f the objects o f the proposed C on 
vention.
Such is the account given o f it by M r. Dexter, who, we must
remember, was up to that moment one o f their own party, and
was therefore undoubtedly made acquainted with their whole
views. Coincident with this, their papers openly spoke o f a
dissolution o f the Union, as a less evil than the destruction o f
their commerce.
But the manly opposition o f Dexter, united with the republican
majority in the Senate, disheartened their councils, and the pro
je ct once more slept, till the winter o f 1813-14. O f its revival
at that time, we shall speak in our next.

No. IV.
In M ay, 1813, the federal party obtained a majority in all
branches o f the government o f Massachusetts. Massachusetts
was, therefore, now ready to prepare for giving ‘ the tone,’ to
the neighboring states. As, however, the legislative session at
that season is always very short, and as the patriotic T o m p k in s
had, after a warm contest, just been re-elected Governer o f New
Y ork , a state on whose aid the Conventionists had rested many
hopes, it was thought expedient to defer com m encing operations
till the follow ing session, in January, 1814. A ccordingly, pre
vious to the session, great exertions were made to induce the
people o f the different parts o f the state to send in petitions to
their legislature, depicting, in lively colors, their distresses, and
calling on the state government to afford them relief. It should
be noted, however, that, o f the four or five hundred towns (i. e.
townships) in the state, only about thirty-five petitioned. Still*
this number was sufficient to make a sound. A s a specimen, we
give the following extract from one o f the petitions:
“ W e remember the resistance o f our fathers to oppressions, which dwindle
into insignificance, when compared with those we are called upon to endure.

The rights ‘ which we have received from God, we will never yield to man.’
W e call upon our state legislature to protect us in the enjoyment o f those
privileges, to assert which our fathers died, and to defend which we profess
ourselves ready to resist unto blood,”

So promising were the signs o f the times, that the leading fed
eral paper o f Boston (Centinel, January 5, 1814,) made this
proclamation :
“ A crisis is at hand.— From every quarter we hear o f deep and loud dis
content at the conduct o f the war, and o f fixed resolution to set on foot
spirited and constitutional measures to restore peace.”

Just at this moment, however, an unlucky incident occurred,
On the 30th December, 1813, the Bramble, a British flag o f
truce, arrived at Annapolis, bringing news o f the refusal o f E ng
land to accept the mediation o f Russia, but o f her willingness to
open direct negociations for peace. This news reached Boston
about eight days before the meeting o f the legislature. Instantly
all was aback. T he goodly materials o f resistance and disunion
were scattered and disjointed by the rumors o f peace. Though
the memorials from different parts called loudly for aid, especially
against the embargo o f December, 1 8 1 3 ; though the newspa
pers, during the session, were occasionally invoking the legisla
ture to ‘ face the foe,’ meaning by ‘ the foe’ the government o f the
Union— yet, after much consultation, the leaders deemed it most
prudent to postpone the project to a more fit opportunity. They,
therefore, contented themselves with a long and inflammatory
Report on the subject o f the memorials. A m ong other things
the report sa y s:
“ W e spurn the idea that the free, sovereign, and independent state o f
Massachusetts is reduced to a mere municipal corporation, without power to
protect its people, and to defend them from oppression, from whatever quarter
it comes. Whenever the national compact is violated, and the citizens o f
this state are oppressed by cruel and unauthorized law, this legislature is
bound to interpose its power and wrest from the oppressor his victim.”
“ T he question, then, is not a question o f power or right with this legisla
ture, but o f time and expediency.”
“ Ardently desiring peace, they [the committee] are disposed to allow the
government some time longer to prove its sincerity, and to retrace its steps.”
“ And the committee doubt not that the real friends o f peace will continue
conscientiously to refrain from affording any voluntary aid or encouragement
to this most disastrous war.”

A m ong the remedies discussed in the report, one is a Conven
tion o f Delegates from certain states, “ to propose, urge, and
even insist upon, such explicit declarations o f power or restriction,
as will prevent the most hardy from any future attempts to op
press, under the color o f the Constitution.” But for this remedy,
they were not then prepared, though they declared the right o f
resorting to it. The truth is, the arrival o f the Bramble had dis
concerted all their plans.

As great expectations, however had been formed by political
zealots, o f the interposition o f the state, an apology was due for
the disappointment o f these expectations. Accordingly, the Centinel, in announcing the adjournment o f the Legislature, made
the apology. It b egan thus:
“ T he adjournment o f the legislature, without some effectual interposition
for the relief o f their suffering constituents, will have created disappointment
in many instances to friends and enemies. It is well known that a firm and
intelligent majority sufficiently numerous to look down all opposition were
prepared to adopt any measures which the conviction o f sober judgment
would justify ; and that the great body o f the people o f this state were ready
to support the legislature in any course which they might have authorised.
It is also an agreed point, that the tyranny and oppression resulting from laws
made in violation o f the federal compact, would have justified the people o f
this commonwealth in performing the great duty o f self-protection, for aid in
which, if requisite, there is sufficient assurance o f co-operation, from other
states whose circumstances are similar, arising not from compact, but from
known disposition, and the feelings o f good fellowship and mutual interests.
There was in short no obstacle to the execution o f any system, which might
have been resolved on that would not have vanished before the Majesty o f
the New England L ion , rising in his strength.”

I n the close, several reasons are assigned for their “ dignified for
bearance.” T h e first is, the hope o f such a change in public opin
ion as would produce reform “ without open or violent collisions,
which once commenced might not be easily appeased.” Another
is, that “ laws framed for the express and innocent purpose o f
protecting the coasting trade and fisheries; or a convention o f
delegates for the definite objects o f redress o f grievances,” might
have retarded peace— that “ an open opposition here, though
professedly confined to particular laws,” might have “ outraged
or intimidated our Cabinet into concessions o f Eastern Interests.”
Another is, the hope o f peace. Another— “ there is time enough
yet— the spirit o f the country will not be broken in ninety days,
unless it be already too base and degenerate for patriotic exer
tion.”
This manifesto bears the plain stamp o f authority. It was
evidently written b y some leading Conventionist.
Such was the issue o f the third attempt at organizing opposi
tion to the union. T h e first attempt in 1809, was defeated by
Erskine’ s arrangement; the second in 1812, by D e x t e r ; and
the third, in January, 1814, b y the Bramble. In our next we
shall remark on the fourth and last attempt, in the autumn o f the
same year.

No. V.
O n the 24th o f August, 1814, the British entered Washington.
About the 30th, the news o f the event reached Boston, and was
received, by some o f the heated leaders o f disunion, with open
expressions o f exultation. This was the moment for their favorite
project. T he capital sacked and burnt; the victorious Vandals
on their march to Baltimore ; Eastport and Castine captured ;
an enemy’s fleet on Lake Champlain, boasting its superiority to
our own, and on the point o f an attack ; an army o f 14,000
men, partly W ellington’s troops, led by W ellington’s Generals,
and all headed by the Governor General o f Canada, co-operating
with this fleet, ready to drive from Plattsburg a few regulars and
militia, and intended to proceed thence and winter in Albany or
N ew -York, and perhaps be met there by Ross, from Washington :
all this, joined by the news from England o f an immense expe
dition ready to sail for some part o f the American coast, pointed
out to the leading actors at Boston that juncture as the moment
fitted for the fourth attempt to put into successful operation their
machine o f disorganization. I f Gov. Prevost, as he confidently
expected, had penetrated to Albany, New England would have
been almost cut off from the rest o f the Union. A Convention,
therefore, assembled at Hartford, or any other place near A lb a n ,
would have been ready to arrange such articles o f capitulation
and neutrality, as should suit the views o f the two contracting
parties.
Accordingly, on the 7th o f September, four days before the
repulse o f the British at Plattsburg and the capture o f their fleet
on Lake Champlain, Gov. Strong issued a proclamation for con
vening the legislature o f Massachusetts, on the 5th o f October ;
and the same number o f the Centinel which published this pro
clamation, (September 10,) contained a very conspicuous essay,
headed “ The Crisis,” which gave a clue to the objects o f this
session, and o f which the following are extracts :
“ What then shall we do to be saved ? One thing only. T he people must
rise in their majesty, p r o t e c t t h e m s e l v e s , and compel their unworthy
servants to obey their will. L ove to the constitution, which has been so
shamefully abused, will preserve Mr. Madison in his chair until his term ex
pires ; but he ought to be compelled to use his powers to save the country
from utter destruction. He ought to be compelled to dismiss his whole corps
o f incompetent or corrupt ministers, and replace them with men o f fortitude
and love o f country.”
“ Let our legislature, when assembled, choose commissioners, and invite
the neighboring states to do the same. Let these delegates proceed to W ash
ington, or wherever else Mr. Madison is to be found, and tell him that he
ought to change his ministers and his measures ; that he must abandon the
invasion o f Canada— to say conquest would be ridiculous : that he ought to

show to the nation with whom we are at war that those men who made that
war when Bonaparte was making his last attempt to subjugate England,
through Russia, are not in power ; that he must, i f necessary, recal some o f
his present obnoxious Envoys, and appoint others ; and that he must make
one fair and honest attempt to obtain peace, without cunning or equivocation.
I f he will do this, peace will be had— my life for it ; i f not, the country will
rise, as one man, to finish a war, then, and not till then, just and necessary.
I f he will not do this, but will continue to prefer his party to his country,
these delegates should be empowered to adjust terms o f union with other
states, and to make a peace f o r themselves. Self-preservation, the great law
o f nature, requires this, and it is worse than idle to expect any other course.
T h e Union is already dissolved, practically.”

Under such auspices, and with such views, was issued the pro
clamation for convening the legislature. Instantly, however, an
untoward event dimmed the horizon o f this young day o f inde
pendence. On the 11th o f September, the British fleet on L ake
Champlain was annihilated, and the grand expedition o f Prevost
was repulsed at Plattsburg. B y this blow the hope o f immediate
aid from the British army, in severing New E ngland from the
rest o f the Union, was destroyed.
At the same time the destruction at Washington and the plun
der o f Alexandria had excited the feelings o f the people against
the enemy, and led them to vigorous and united preparations for
defence. This was a grief to the leaders in disunion, as it pro
duced a direct counteraction to their favorite object. In the
Centinel o f O ctober 1st, in a column, headed “ A ll the objects o f
the war attained,” this spirit o f union is severely reprehended.
“ Prior to the war, (says the writer,) the moderation o f Great
Britain, in sending minister after minister, and submitting to
every contumely, in order to preserve p e a ce ; the generous spirit
she had displayed in the defence o f the liberties o f E urope,” &c.
&c. “ had gone far to overcom e that bitter spirit which the war
o f the Revolution had excited.” But now, the writer complains,
“ there is as hopeful a stock o f exasperation collected as Mr.
M a d i s o n could desire.”
H e closed by recommending that the
“ Legislature should vote that it is inexpedient longer to prose
cute this ruinous war, and should pray the President to remove
from his councils all persons who are unfriendly to peace, or who
have advised to this rash measure ;” and that, “ amidst all our
calamities and exertions, the deepest toned sentiments o f indig
nation should be heard against those wicked counsellors,” who
plunged the nation into war.
T h e repulse o f the British at Baltimore also, (the news o f
which was published in the Centinel without a single expression
o f jo y , without a single Laus D eo,) contributed still further to
cast a gloom over the prospects o f the Conventionists.

B ut these events, unpropitious as they were, could not extinguish the courage o f the leaders in this drama. T he plan o f
either compelling the National Administration to give up the
power to themselves, or negociating a separate peace with the
enemy, was a darling o f too great promise to be disinherited by
the force o f a few trifling incidents. T he Legislature had been
summoned. The Rubicon was before them. On their own
bank o f the stream, nothing was found but the blighted husks o f
despair : on the other, their eyes were greeted by the luxuriant
buds o f hope, and the ever bloom ing laurels o f office. Could
human nature choose but pass ?
The legislative drama shall be noticed in our next.

No. VI.
O n the 5th o f October, 1814, commenced the special session

o f the legislature o f Massachusetts ; a session got up expressly
for maturing the convention project. On the very first day o f
the session, the following motion was made in the House :
“ Moved, That a committee be appointed to confer with the New-England
states, and see if they will agree to appoint a committee to join them, and re
pair to the City o f Washington immediately and without delay, then and there
personally to make known to the President the general opinion o f all the New
England states in regard to the present war, and the manner in which it has
been conducted— and inform him that he must either resign his office as
President, or remove those o f his Ministers and other officers o f the general
government who have, by their nefarious plans, ruined the nation— with leave
to report by bill or otherwise.”

This laughable motion was a rather premature throe. The
full time had not arrived, and the apparatus o f accouchment was
yet unprepared. The mover, though one o f the oldest members
o f the House, and though sufficiently important to be one o f the
electors o f President in 1816, still had not that acuteness and that
boundless range o f political vision, which are necessary to lead a
party in crises o f “ great pith and moment.” He had read in
the papers deemed by him oracular, and also undoubtedly been
told the same by his party, that Mr. Madison m ust resign, or at
least turn off his Secretaries; and that the legislature had been
called together for that very purpose. What more natural then,
than a desire to lead in this chivalrous enterprize ? T o seize the
earliest moment— to be th e f i r s t to step forth to the work o f Au
gean purgation, and open a new vista o f saturnian prosperity to
his country— was a thought too brilliant to pass idly away. It
fastened on his mind, and proved its energy by the fact o f the above
motion.

So premature however was this motion deemed by his friends
that, on the day following, he was induced to withdraw it, “ with
a view o f altering its phraseology!” On the fourth day he re
newed it “ as a m e n d e d :”but what it was “ as amended,” we
have not been told ; nor does any trace o f it appear after this on
the published record. It seems to have been a complete abortion.
About the same time, a motion was made in the Senate, by a
very conspicuous and leading member, to assume the taxes levied
b y the general government within the state, and to turn them in
to the state treasury. This was a favorite object in the career
o f independence. T he right o f taxing, and that o f making war
and peace, were attributes o f sovereignty which were to consti
tute the foundation o f the new confederacy. This motion, how
ever, like that in the house, was premature, and it was withdrawn.
On the 8th o f October, the committee to whom had been re
ferred the Governor’s message, made a long report. In this they
say, that the resources o f the state cannot be supposed sufficient
both for the defence o f its soil and for the payment o f the increas
ing taxes o f the national governm ent; and that “ there remains
to them, therefore, no alternative but submission to the enemy,
or the control o f their own resources to repel his aggressions.
It is impossible to hesitate in making the election. This people
are not ready for conquest or submission.” T h e control o f the
resources o f the state seems thus to have been resolved on. T h ey
also recommend “ a radical reform in the national com pact,” and
conclude their report by several resolves ; for raising an army o f
ten thousand men, for borrowing one million o f dollars, and for
appointing delegates to a New England Convention. These
resolves were passed, after an animated discussion o f four days.
During this discussion, full confirmation was given, if confirma
tion was wanted, o f the objects o f the Convention. W e will not
pay our money to aid in carrying on this war in Canada— said
the leading advocate o f the Convention in the House : and the
Senator above alluded to, in his speech on the occasion, has the
following expressions :
“ I f the ship is sinking, through the indifference or perverseness o f those to
whom the command has been entrusted, has the God o f Nature implanted in
us any principle which forbids a single mariner to abandon her, and to seek
for safety by seizing upon any plank that may offer, and casting himself into
the bosom o f the deep? if the nation is rushing rapidly to destruction, by meas
ures in which we have had no agency, and which we have resisted to the ut
most extent o f our constitutional power, shall we sit with folded arms, and
submit silently to our fate, or cut the knot, and sever ourselves from the mighty
ruin ? L et self-preservation, the first and paramount law o f nature and o f
nations, answer the inquiry ?”
“ T he hand o f the architect must be speedily employed, either in razing it
[the constitution o f the U . States] to the ground, or in re-building it, with in

creased magnificence and splendor.” “ Sir, when the spirit and essence o f
the constitution have fled, the lifeless form is no longer worth preserving ;
and the parchment on which it is written, may as well be thrown away, to
become food for worms, as to be preserved in your national archives.”

That the army o f ten thousand men, authorized at this session
to be raised by the state, was intended less to contend against
the enemy, than to awe the national government, and that portion
o f the citizens who stedfastly adhered to that government, is a fact
too clear to be doubted. Were they wanted to resist the enemy?
The letter o f Gov. Strong to Mr. Eustis, the Secretary o f War,
dated Aug. 5, 1812, answers, no. Gov. S. sa ys:
“ Every harbor or port within the state has a compact settlement, and gen
erally the country around the harbors is populous. “ The militia are well
organized, and would undoubtedly prefer to defend their fire-sides, in company
with their friends, under their own officers, rather than to be marched to some
distant place, while strangers might be introduced to take their places at home.
“ In Boston the militia is well disciplined, and would be mustered in an
hour, upon any signal o f an approaching enemy, and in six hours the neigh
boring towns could pour in a greater force than any invading enemy will
bring against it.
“ The same remark applies to Salem, Marblehead, and Newburyport;
places whose harbors render an invasion next to impossible.”
“ Kennebunk is unassailable by any thing but boats, which the numerous
armed population is competent to resist. Portland has a militia and indepen
dent corps sufficiently numerous for its defence, and the same is the case with
Wiscasset and Castine. [Mark Castine.]
“ Against predatory incursions the militia o f each place would be able to
defend their property, and in a very short time they would be aided, if neces
sary, by the militia o f the surrounding country. In case o f a more serious
invasion, whole brigades or divisions could be collected seasonably for defence.”

Here the charge, so often and so vehemently brought against
the National Government for deserting Massachusetts and leav
ing her a defenceless prey to the enemy, is explicitly refuted by
Gov. Strong himself. At the very opening o f the war, when the
National Government were preparing additional defence, it was
told that Massachusetts needed it n ot; that she was able, by her
excellent militia, to defend herself, either against “ predatory in
cursions” or against “ more serious invasion.” W as the Nation
al government bound to disbelieve Gov. Strong— to give him
the lie? N o — his word was taken as truth; and Massachusetts,
under his guardianship, was considered safe.
Where, then, we again ask, was the necessity o f an army o f
ten thousand men ? It was to support the measures about to be
taken by the Conventionists. T h ey knew that they had but a
bare majority in New England, even on current party questions :
and they knew that when their whole plan should be developed,
an immense majority would be against them, unless they had a
strong military force ready to put down the first symptoms o f
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rebellion against their unrighteous power. Had Prevost’s expe
dition succeeded, a much smaller force would have been deemed
sufficient: that, however, failing, ten thousand were necessary.
That such was the object o f this army, further p roof is at hand.

No. VII.
T o prove still more clearly that the army o f ten thousand men
had, for its real object, the support o f the Hartford Convention
and its measures, and that the object o f the Convention was to
seize on the taxes levied by the general government, and to make
a separate peace with the enemy, unless its advocates should be
admitted to control the national councils, we give the follow ing
extracts from the Boston Centinel, o f N ov. 26, 1814. T hey
are from N o. 9 o f a series o f essays, addressed to the President
o f the United States, on the subject o f the Convention, published
originally in the Boston D aily Advertiser, but republised by the
editor o f the Centinel with express approbation, and the decla
ration that they contain “ the opinion o f a well informed writer
on the subject” o f the Convention.
It is useless to say, that this was an annoymous essay. T h e con
clusion is irresistible, that it had the approbation o f the leaders o f
the federal party. I f it had not had, they must have remonstrated
against it.
T h ey would have said to the editor o f the Centinel,
“ Sir, you are ruining us. Y our paper is the leading paper o f
our p arty; it circulates among all classes, and to a greater ex
tent than any other paper in the state; yet in this paper you are
diffusing sentiments which we abhor. Y ou are openly advoca
ting the assumption o f the national taxes; a separate peace with
the enem y; a dissolution o f the Union, and a new confederation
o f a portion o f the states; objects most pointedly denounced by
W a sh in g t o n .
Y ou are ruining our party. W e, therefore,
furnish you with a disavowal o f these objects, and demand o f
you to publish the disavowal. I f you refuse this, or if you con
tinue to avow such detestable doctrines, we discard your paper,
withdraw our support, and use our combined influence to check
its circulation.”
Such would have been, such must have been, the language o f
the leading federalists to M ajor Russell, if they had disapproved,
as they ought, those doctrines. This, however, they did not do.
N o t one lisp o f disapprobation appeared in the Centinel. T h e
doctrines, therefore, passed for (what they most unquestionably
were) the views o f the leading federalists. T he extracts follow :

“ T o the cry o f disunion and ‘ separation o f the states,’ there is a very
plain and obvious answer. The states are already separated ; the bond o f
Union is already broken— broken by you [Mr. Madison] and the short-sight
ed, selfish politicians who compose your councils. All that we see in you,
and in them, as rulers, are the convulsions which precede and announce dis
solution. The New-England delegates may aid in the arrangement o f the
succession ; but they could not, if they would, arrest the progress o f death.”
“ The war is the most pressing and obvious evil ; but all who hope for
a radical cure, and a restoration o f former vigor, must prepare for more
thorough changes than peace can effect. But peace demands, and will no
doubt receive, the first consideration.”
“ I f they [the Convention] find that war is to continue, it is to be hoped
they will recommend, and that the states will adopt the recommendation, that
no men or money shall be permitted to g o out o f N ew -England until the mili
tia expences, already incurred, are reimbursed; nor until the most ample
provision is made fo r the defence o f the N ew England slates during the con
tinuance o f the war.” “ I f the New England states determine t o p a y no
m o n e y , and s e n d f o r t h no m e n , while the war continues, until their own
defence is provided for, they may save themselves.
“ This arrangement may do while the war lasts. But is the war to be
eternal? Are the New England states, who are now unquestionably absolv
ed from all obligations to the United States, since the United States have
ceased to perform any o f its obligations towards them, to continue the war,
if they can make peace ? It is clear that you, Mr. Madison, cannot make
peace. W ould not you, and all your Southern friends, feel heartily obliged
to the New England states if they would make a fair and honorable peace
with the enemy, and provide in the treaty that each o f the several states that
might think fit to become a party to the treaty, should have the right to do
so ?” “ It was to take care o f our commercial rights, as you say, that you
made the war. W ould it be unreasonable for us to take care o f them ourselves
in making a peace ? The Convention cannot do a more popular act, not
only in New England, but throughout the Atlantic states, than to make a
peace for the good o f the whole.
“ There may be some tender-nerved gentlemen who may be startled at
these propositions; and there are, probably, some grown up people, who, in
the language o f the nursery, are afraid o f pokers. Such gentlemen must
comfort themselves with the reflection, that if the people find their able, and
honorable, and wise men unwilling to lead the way to a peaceable and law
ful remedy o f evils, they will undertake to do this work for themselves, and
may not, while heated in the chase, know when they have pursued far enough
to accomplish their object.
“ The several states may make treaties with foreign powers, by the consent
o f Congress. I f the confederacy has been broken up by the acts or omis
sions o f the United States, the several states may make treaties without such
consent. And whether the confederacy may be considered as broken up, or
not, the states may make whatever arrangements they think fit with foreign
powers, to save themselves from utter ruin, because the duty o f self-preser
vation is superior to all other duties. As the New England states have al
ways been sincerely attached to the Union, and are still desirous that it should
be preserved, a peace made by them would promote this object, and open the
way to a new and durable alliance among the states, founded on the neces
sary amendments o f the present national compact.
“ It is to be hoped that the Convention will see fit to propose a more gen
eral Convention o f the states, including all north o f the Potomac, for the
purpose o f forming a new confederation, grounded on experience ; without,.however, excluding the southern Atlantic states, W e always did feel, and

we continue to feel, a sincere conviction, that the northern states and the
southern Atlantic states, have a community o f interests, and a natural dependence on each other. W e lament that the mad policy o f rulers, who
have sacrificed every thing to party, should have put at risk this natural connexion. T h e New England states dread a separation. They see in it great
and embarrassing evils; but they see, in the present course o f things, evils
o f a much more imposing and ruinous character.”

In addition to these views, the Centinel o f Dec. 7, 10, and 17,
1814, contained three essays, headed “ the Crisis,” evidently
written by one o f the prominent Conventionists, still more fully
developing their views. T he Convention, it will be remembered,
commenced its doings, Dec. 15, 1814. Extracts follow :
“ T he crisis is com e— the time is in our hands, when our conduct must
decide whether prosperity and happiness, or misery and disgrace, are to fill
up the after lives o f ourselves and our children.” “ It is time to act. W e
have talked too long. W e have emboldened our enemies, and made our
selves ridiculous.” “ W e talked o f ‘ our sighs and tears,’ as if we were a land
o f women, and not o f men. Had we commanded, and not prayed— had we
told the Government that the embargo was an outrage upon our liberties,
which would not be endured a single day,” &c. New England “ will now
meet every danger, and go through every difficulty, until her rights are re
stored to the full, and settled too strongly to be shaken. She will put aside
all half-way measures; she will look with an eye o f doubt on those who pro
pose them ; she will tell such men, that, if they hope to lead in the cause o f
New England independence, they must do it in the spirit o f New England
men.”
“ W e must retain the means necessary to our self-defence. W e must no
longer be drained by taxation and enlistment.”
“ Those who startle at the danger o f a separation, tell us, that the soil o f
New England is hard and sterile.” — “ Do these men forget what national
energy can do for a people ? Have they not read o f Holland ? D o they
not remember that it grew in wealth and power, amidst contest and alarm ?
That it threw o ff the yoke o f Spain, (our Virginia,) and its chapels became
churches, and its poor men’s cottages, prince’s palaces ? I f the dissolution o f
the Union would bring those evils with which their fearful imaginations are
teeming, & c.
“ They [the Convention] see that no palliation half-way measures will
quell their [the people’s] irritation.” “ Shall we withhold our men and money
from the Government, and when it is filled with unleavened malice at our
opposition, leave it to the most malignant spirits can wait upon her vengeance,
to make a peace for us with our enemy ? Shall we set at naught the power
o f Government, and then throw ourselves on the magnanimity o f a boisterous
C l a y , a jealous and vindictive A d a m s , a cunning G a l l a t i n , and a R u s SELL ?”

& c.

“ There are still a'few who have started at the sound o f eastern neutrality,
and a treaty o f commerce with England. They tremble, too, at the name o f
a Convention.” “ Have restrictions and war become so dear to us, that a
peace and commerce with the world would arouse the minority and drive our
friends from us ? W ould release from taxes, which must otherwise be laid,
make the people uneasy, and throw them into the arms o f the General Gov
ernment ? Our course is so easy and plain, that I know not how the most
timid can pause at the entrance upon it.” “ A peace with England for a
single year, would bring every state east o f Virginia into our confederacy.”

“ Should that peace be deferred, how long would the rulers o f the several
[New England] states maintain that popularity necessary to our preservation.”
“ It is said that to make a treaty o f commerce with the enemy is to violate
the constitution, and sever the union. Are they not both already virtually
destroyed ? Or in what stage o f existence would they be, should we declare
a neutrality, or even withhold taxes and men ? Let us leave it to the schools
to put this question at rest, while we are guarding the honor and independence
o f New England. By a commercial treaty with England, which shall provide
for the admission o f such states as may wish to come into it, and which shall
prohibit England from making a treaty with the south and west, which does
not grant us at least equal privileges with herself, our commerce will be se
cured to us,” &c.
“ Throwing off all connection with this wasteful war, making peace with
our enemy, and opening once more our commerce with the world, would be a
wise and manly course. T he occasion demands it o f us, and the people at
large are ready to meet it.”
“ W hat have we to fear, though the malice o f our rulers be unsated ? Can
their scanty, unpaid soldiery arrest us on our way ; or their black population
overrun New England ? Can a government, drained o f wealth, and as void
o f credit as o f honor, subdue us to its lawless will ?”
“ W e must put away our childish fears o f resistance.” “ Let us linger a
little longer ; let us wait till the United States’ armies are filled, by bounties
or conscription ; let us look on in silence, while our population, disappointed
o f protection at home, is moving westward. Then, beggared and dwindled in
numbers, with veterans for enemies, will we begin the work o f New England
independence. This ever lingering, timid spirit, is not that which achieved
our old independence.”

Another series o f numbers, addressed to the members o f the
Convention, and signed “ Epaminondas,” was published in the
Centinel, from Dec. 21 to Jan. 10, breathing a similar spirit o f
rebellion. T ake the following sentences :
“ Advance boldly to the task assigned you. Suffer yourselves not to be en
tangled by the cobwebs o f a compact which has long since ceased to exist.”
“ Remember the heroes o f the revolution— invoke th e spirits o f O t i s , A d a m s ,
and H a n c o c k — the G e n i u s o f N e w E n g l a n d beckons you forward. Our
fathers bled at Lexington and Bunker’s H ill; their children cannot be slaves.”
W e are prepared to “ obtain by force that redress which has been denied to
remonstrance.” “ N e w E ngland is unanimous , and we announce our
irrevocable d e c r e e , that the tyrannical oppression o f those who at present
u s u r p the powers o f the constitution is beyond endurance, and w e w i l l
r e s i s t i t .”
“ W e solemnly d e c r e e , that delay can no longer be suffered ;
we will make our last and desperate struggle against the tyrants.”

Extracts might be multiplied almost without end— but, enough.
B e it again remembered, that this Centinel, the leading paper o f
the party in New-England, was loaded week after week with
these flagitious appeals, without one single sentence o f disappro
bation to counteract them. T he conclusion, therefore, is full— is
irresistable, that they expressed the views o f the leaders o f the
party. T o reject this conclusion would be to reject the plainest
rules o f evidence, the strongest dictates o f common sense. Dis
union, therefore, was the object o f the Convention ; and the army
o f ten thousand was intended to guard this object from defeat.
Our next will conclude.

23

No. VIII.
GEN TLEM EN ,

I n closing these remarks an apology is due to yourselves, and
to your readers, for the imperfect manner in which the remarks
have been presented. T h e apology is found in the very small
portion o f time which the writer has been able to give them, not
a sentence o f which has had a second draft; in the want o f en
gagedness, produced by an entire conviction that very little
attention would be given by the public to an elaborate series o f
remarks on a trite subject, while such unusual interest continues
to be excited by the leading topics o f the day ; and in the difficul
ty o f exhibiting a lucid and yet concise statement o f facts, where
the materials are so abundant in quantity and so various in kind.
Let this apology suffice.
So numerous, indeed, are the documents in p ro o f o f the trea
sonable objects o f the Convention at Hartford, that we have been
able merely to glance at some o f the most prominent. A volume
only would embrace the whole. T he following incidents we will
just n am e:
1. T h e act o f the legislature o f Massachusetts, refusing to the
United States, after the expiration o f thirty days, the use o f the
prisons o f the state for the safe-keeping o f the British prisoners
o f war.
2. T h e motion made by Mr. Otis, in the House o f Represen
tatives, to support the Governor o f Vermont in his disorganizing
attempt to withdraw a certain portion o f the militia from the ser
vice o f their country.
3. T h e disapprobation implied in a legislative call made on
General K ing, for information respecting the aid given by him
to the raising o f volunteers in the District o f Maine, for the de
fence o f the country.
4. T h e exemption from blockade given b y the enemy to a
portion o f our coast, on the avowed ground o f the friendly views
o f the inhabitants o f that portion o f country towards the enemy .
5. T h e legislative designation o f a town by the name o f the
military chieftain o f the nation with whom we were at war, and
announcing such designation in large capitals, just after having
withdrawn the name o f one o f our own patriots, the second offi
cer o f the republic, from a town which had borne it for nearly
thirty years.
6. T h e numerous seditious sermons uttered from the pulpit ;
some openly advocating a separation o f the states.
7. T h e annunciation, by the Centinel, o f the concurrence o f
Connecticut in the appointment o f Delegates to Hartford, under

this head : “ S econd p i l l a r in a new F e d e r a l e d i f i c e reared
and that o f Rhode Island, “ T h ir d p i l l a r r a i s e d .”
8. The calmness with which persons o f intelligence and politi
cal character talked of fighting, and dismembering the Union ;
and the declaration, after the war, that nothing but peace pre
vented such dismemberment.
9. The convention o f inn-holders, &c. in the counties o f Hamp
shire, Franklin, and Hampden, at Northampton, about the last
o f December, 1814, while the Convention at Hartford was sitting;
and their resolution, passed and published, that they would not
take out licenses for the new year, and pay the duties on them,
until they should learn the decision o f the Convention at Hartford.
10. The resolution passed at a meeting at Reading, (Mass.)
that they “ would not enter their carriages, pay their continen
tal taxes, or aid, inform, or assist any officer in their collection.”
Add to these that mass o f evidence at which we have glanced
in our preceding numbers ; the striking coincidence o f the plan
developed by Henry with that adopted in 1814 ; the abortive
attempt o f August, 18 12, declared by one o f their own party to
be no less threatening in its character than the rebellion o f Shays;
in 1786; the renewed attempt, in January, 1814, defeated by
the prospects o f peace ; and the last attempt, commenced in
Sept. o f the same year, and continued till the actual arrival o f
the treaty o f peace, during which time the Centinel was devoted
to seditious appeals to the people, on the necessity o f assuming
the national taxes, o f resisting the national government, and o f
making a separate peace with the enemy, without a single sentence
from any quarter in disapprobation o f these appeals :— add all
these, and we have a chain o f indissoluble p ro o f o f the disorgan
izing objects o f the Convention, which no ingenuity o f its advo
cates can sever.
“ One o f the Convention,” in seven letters, has attempted to
prove that the Convention had no reference to a dissolution o f the
Union. Has he done it? Not at all. W e have already said,
that his prominent argument rests on the fact, that neither the pre
vious legislative proceedings, nor the journal or report o f the C on
vention itself, advocate such a dissolution. And we have already
replied, that this fact proves nothing. T he conspiring legisla
tures could not be so foolish as to avow the object distinctly.
Nor could the Convention be so short sighted as to commit to
paper those proceedings which they found it necessary to veil
from the public eye by closed doors. As to the report o f the
Convention, the editor o f the Centinel, so early as N ov. 26, 18 14,
in delineating the probable course o f the Convention, had declar
ed, “ They probably will not adopt any important measure
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o f that project in New England, bears witness. All bear wit
ness, that the people were pure from the contamination.
Again too we protest against the imputation o f personal mo
tives in these remarks.
W a s h i n g t o n himself shall be our
advocate, whose farewell injunction bids us “ discountenance
whatever may suggest even a suspicion that the Union can in any
event be abandoned, and. indignantly frow n upon the first dawning
o f every attempt to alienate any portion o f our country from the
r e s t”
M ASSACH USETTS.
P . S. Since the above was written, the writer has received
a letter from a certain patriot in Massachusetts, whose ardent
devotion o f a long life and o f distinguished abilities to the service
o f his country, both in civil and military offices o f the highest
responsibility, entitles him to the endless gratitude o f the repub
lic. In noticing the declaration made by “ One o f the C on
vention” respecting the want o f the means o f defence on the sea
board o f New England, he makes the following remarks :
“ At that time, [1814] Boston harbor was fortified with two strong enclosed
forts and several well-constructed large batteries, with an ample supply o f
cannon, mortars, and all kind o f ammunition, and upwards o f three hundred
regular troops ; and in all the principal ports and harbors, from New Haven
to Passamaquoddy, were regular well-constructed forts and batteries, with a
full supply o f cannon and ammunition, and regular troops at each post suffi
cient for managing the artillery ; and, with such aid as might have been
afforded by the militia o f the vicinity, every point on the sea-board could have
been very well defended. But that aid, with some few exceptions, was refus
ed. T h e supply o f the munitions o f war was so ample, that, on the request
o f the Governor o f Massachusetts, he was supplied, on loan from the United
States, for the use o f the militia, with upwards o f twenty field-pieces, mostly
twelve pounders, well mounted, and furnished with from thirty to forty rounds
o f fixed ammunition each, and with one hundred thousand musket balls, fifty
barrels o f powder, & c. &c. and was also furnished with one thousand mus
kets. And there had been previously furnished by the United States, from
two to six 24 or 18 pounders, mounted on travelling carriages, with a supply
o f powder and balls, to Newport, Bristol, Marblehead, and Salem, Beverly,
Newburyport, Portsmouth, and Portland, with suitable buildings for the safe
keeping o f the cannon, &c . I f the Governors o f the other New England
states had, with that good faith and patriotism, turned out the militia on the
call o f the President, as the Governor o f New Hampshire did, we should have
had nothing to fear from the enemy on our coast ; nor would this state have
been reduced to the humiliating necessity o f praying Congress to relieve us
from a burden laid on the citizens o f the state, by the treacherous conduct
o f their Governor and his advisers.”

T his highly satisfactory statement, united with that given
b y G ov. Strong himself, as quoted in a preceding number, must
put to eternal rest the charge, made against the National Govern
ment, o f neglecting the defence o f New England.

M.

definitively at their first session.” This original intention was
confirmed by the conviction, that the people were not yet ripe
for resistance. Another Convention in June, therefore, was re
commended, and the national government distinctly threatened
with the “ confusion” that awaited that epoch. As the co-oper
ation o f a British army at Albany was no longer expected, Hart
ford was no longer a suitable rendezvous for these patriots. June
would be the season for a British fleet on our coast. Boston,
therefore, was a place peculiarly fitted for requisite negociations,
and Boston was selected, as the theatre o f the second Convention.
Again, however, we say, and let the fact be ever remembered,
that the printed report o f the Convention itself, without any re
ference to the proposed second Convention in June, gives abun
dant p roof that the leaders in that project have forfeited the con
fidence o f their country.
That report itself proves, that the
expediency o f a “ dissolution” o f the Union, o f “ open resistance,”
and o f some “ new form o f confederacy,” was actually discussed in
the Convention. And now, forsooth, “ one o f the Convention”
presumes to talk o f “ the chimera o f a Northern Confederacy.”
It was in truth a chimera— a monster dire ; not generated by the
enemies o f the Convention, but the Conventionists themselves,
who thus publicly acknowledged their relationship to the illegit
imate bantling. Were no other evidence furnished, this report
would be an everlasting witness o f the justice with which public
indignation rests, and always will rest, on that iniquitous C on
vention.
Were not our own patience, and that o f our readers, quite
exhausted with this topic, we should certainly follow the member
through his letters, and comment on some o f the very strange and
very indefensible positions which he has assumed.
Better
amusements could not be found, nor an easier task undertaken.
But we must spare ourselves and the public ; especially as there
is not even plausibility in his inferences, which demands the com 
mentary.
Again we protest against the member’s calumny, that the
people o f New England are answerable for the demerits o f the
Convention.
An “ immense majority” abhor its memory. T he intrepid
H o l m e s , and a band o f intrepid colleagues, bear witness with
what fearless determination the whole project from the beginning
to the end was resisted. T he military companies which were
silently organized, and ready to take the side o f their country
the moment the overt act o f resistance should be committed, bear
witness. And the present irrecoverable prostration o f the leaders
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